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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present the main contributions that are part of the special issue "Cognition and technology: A 4E perspective" . 4E 
cognition or the embodied and embedded cognitive sciences aim to make sense of the mind as constituted by bodily and environ-
mental aspects. This approach to the mind offers some challenges to our current understanding of technology, and this special issue 
includes an analysis of key epistemic, ontological, and methodological aspects of 4E cognition in relation to the use of technology. .
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The relation of cognition and technology 
is a significant one. Outside philosophy, the use 
of technology has been regarded as an example of 
cognitive development from an ontogenetic and a 
phylogenetic perspective (e.g., Greenfield 1991, 
Meulman et al. 2013). Ethologists (in particular, 
primatologists) have extensively researched the 
use of tools in animals since the last century (e.g., 
White, 1942). Within philosophy, theoreticians 
have discussed in a very detailed way about the 
intricacies of technology and its impact on cognition 
in order to understand the ontology of devices and 
artifacts, the new epistemic dimensions that are 
opened thanks to technological use, and the very 
nature of human and animal minds (Vega, 2009).
Thus, the relation of cognition and 
technology from a philosophical perspective 
goes in two directions: how the use of technology 
illuminates our views on the mind and also how 
our ways of conceiving the mind affect the way we 
understand and create technology for our lives. In 
this special issue, we focus on 4E cognition or the 
post-cognitivist approach to the mind as a framework 
for understanding cognitive skills. The four ‘E’s 
stand for embodied, embedded, enacted, and 
extended, four concepts that summarize the eclectic 
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nature of this approach. What all the views within 
this approach share is the idea that understanding 
cognition in terms of brain states does not suffice 
to fully understand how the mind works. Thus, 
these views emphasize the essential contribution 
of the body and the environment in the shaping 
of cognitive abilities, which is conceptualized 
in the terms ‘embodiment’ and ‘embeddedness’ 
or ‘situatedness’, but there are multiple ways of 
understanding the nature of these contributions. 
Also, there are substantive differences regarding 
some theories within the approach: for example, 
some versions of the extended mind accept a 
minimal representationalism and information-
processing, while some other theories don’t (in 
particular, some varieties of enactivism1 and 
ecological psychology). As we can see, there are 
both shared commitments and clear disagreements 
in what could be the most pluralistic philosophical 
approach to the mind nowadays (Fultot et al., 2016; 
Stapleton 2016; Di Paolo, 2016; Heras-Escribano, 
2016; Loughlin & Zahidi, 2017; Heras-Escribano 
2019a, b; and Heft, 2020).
This 4E approach has taken technology 
into account since its very beginning. In their 
influential paper on the extended mind hypothesis, 
the most famous example consists of a case in 
which someone replaced the function of memory 
storage of a brain with a notebook. How we 
extend the mind through tools, artifacts, and other 
technologies has been analyzed by a wide variety 
of authors in the philosophy of technology from 
a 4E perspective. For example, several authors 
claim that our minds are extended beyond the brain 
thanks to material engagement with technological 
devices (Malafouris, 2013), and that brain, body, 
environment, and tools could be correctly coupled 
to enhance performance through soft assembly 
(Favela, 2019). There has been also a special interest 
in analyzing the epistemic impact of technology 
within a 4E approach (Andrada, 2019). Other 
authors focus on different ethical implications of 
the 4E approach to technology (Carter & Palermos, 
2016; Heersmink, 2017). The wide variety of 
theories within the 4E approach has problems 
of its own, such as the different understandings 
of cognitive integration of technological devices 
according to different approaches (Heersmink, 
2015). Researchers have analyzed how to build 
a better technology from a 4E approach, such as 
in the fields of robotics and sensory substitution 
(Ibañez-Gijón et al. 2013, Lobo et al. 2018). Well-
known technologies have also been analyzed as a 
technological resource from this perspective, as 
it happens to the internet (Smart, Heersmink, and 
Clowes, 2017).
Nevertheless, there is still a lot of work to do 
in this field from a 4E perspective, and this special 
issue aims to offer a humble contribution in that 
direction. In this issue, a total of six authors deal 
with different aspects on the relation of technology 
and cognition from a 4E perspective. First of 
all, Jesús Vega uses Ingold’s notion of taskscape 
for making sense of how material artifactual 
culture relates materiality and cultural and bodily 
meaningfulness through affordances. Certainly, 
this is a great line of research that strengthens 
the relation between technology and affordances, 
emphasizing the importance of both of them for 
our mental lives, while offering a strong starting 
point for the analysis of the structure of experience. 
Gloria Andrada challenges the phenomenology 
derived from extended cognition by criticizing 
the idea that a technological object becomes 
transparent in use. This paper offers an insightful 
criticism of the notion of transparency in extended 
cognition, providing substantial development in 
the analysis of the epistemological consequences 
of the extended mind hypothesis. Gunnar Declerck 
offers an innovative transcendentalist approach 
to the human technological system, focusing 
on an understudied aspect of technology:  its 
phenomenological conditions of existence. Then 
he contrasts his Heideggerian approach to the 
Gibsonian view on affordances arguing why 
affordances and equipments cannot be synonyms 
given that what an object allows to achieve for a 
human being has to be related to “a network of 
functional references” that exist within the social 
normativity of a community. This paper inaugurates 
a way of understanding the phenomenology of 
technology from a new perspective and deepens 
into the dialogue between cognitive science and 
phenomenology. Vicente Raja’s paper offers a 
classification of the different theories within the 
4E approach depending on their understanding 
of technology (either in an instrumental or in an 
embodied way) and draws some consequences. This 
paper is a wonderful contribution that develops 
some key ideas of the embodied understanding 
of technology, even for the realm of the political 
dimension of technology. Finally, Carlos de 
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Aldama describes how the extended mind has been 
discussed in previous literature. He claims that 
the use of technology in educational contexts has 
been considered as an asset to motivate students 
without the necessary reflection about the changes 
that it implies in our cognition. This paper aims 
to go further in illuminating cases in which the 
use of technological devices in these contexts can 
either diminish or enhance cognitive capacities. 
This paper develops important aspects of situated 
cognition as applied to educational contexts by 
providing examples from the literature that should 
be taken into account for having a virtuous use of 
technology in these contexts.
In conclusion, this special issue offers 
innovative and valuable contributions on several 
aspects of the relation between technology 
and cognition from an embodied and situated 
perspective with the hope that it will be valuable 
and illuminating for the 4E community.
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NOTE
1 Although orthodox views on enactivism reject mental representations tout court, some others don’t. See, for example, 
Noë’s (2004: 17) view on sensorimotor contingencies.
